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After a decision by the Court of
Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, 
Division Four, Case No. B121917
_______________
APPLICATION OF KEITH N. HYLTON 
TO FILE BRIEF AS AMICUS CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
_______________
Keith N. Hylton, an economist and law professor at Boston
University, respectfully requests permission to file the attached
brief as amicus curiae in support of petitioners/plaintiffs in this
matter, Greg and Jo Ann Johnson.  Professor Hylton teaches
torts and antitrust law, among other subjects.  He has a Ph.D.
in Economics from MIT and a J.D. from Harvard University, and
is a member of the American Law Institute.  Professor Hylton is
the author of a leading textbook on antitrust law and has also
published more than 40 articles in law journals and
peer-reviewed law and economics journals, many of them on the
subject of tort liability.  For a more complete list of his
professional qualifications and publications, see
http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/profiles/hyltonk.
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Professor Hylton submits this amicus brief to address a
point argued in the brief of respondent Ford Motor Company
(“Ford Br.”).  Ford urges this Court to rule out, in the fixing of
punitive damages in California, any consideration of the illicit
profits received by a defendant through its wrongful course of
conduct directed at a plaintiff and others within the state.  In
support of this position, Ford makes a law-and-economics
argument that consideration of a defendant’s illicit profits from
a wrongful course of conduct is not “necessary to achieve
appropriate levels of punishment and deterrence” because, Ford
asserts, “substantial economic literature” shows that “the
socially correct level of deterrence is created by compelling
responsible parties to pay compensatory damages alone.”  Ford
Br. at 36 & n.13.  The sole authority cited on this point is an
article by Professors Polinsky and Shavell, Punitive Damages:  An
Economic Analysis (1998) 111 Harv. L. Rev. 869, 906.
Ford’s analysis is fundamentally mistaken.  There is, in
fact, little if any support in the economic literature for Ford’s
conclusion.  Indeed, the consensus in the economic literature
has been against Ford’s conclusion for at least two centuries. 
Even the Polinsky and Shavell article cited by Ford supports the
conclusion (in portions not cited by Ford) that punitive damages
are socially desirable and that it is important to take into
account a wrongdoer’s illicit profits in a case involving the type
of intentionally wrongful conduct involved in this case (as
summarized in the Court of Appeals opinion).  Id. at 874 n.8,
907 n.120, 918 & n.154, 945-47.  Professor Hylton has analyzed
the Polinsky and Shavell article and related publications dating
back to 1764 in two papers, Punitive Damages and the Economic
Theory of Penalties (1998) 87 Geo. L.J. 421, and The Theory of
Penalties and The Economics of Criminal Law (10/04 draft) Law




Professor Hylton submits this amicus brief to help ensure
this Court understands the error in Ford’s law-and-economics
argument, and to provide the Court with a more complete view
of how law-and-economics principles properly bear on the
consideration of a defendant’s illicit profits from a wrongful
course of conduct in fixing the level of punitive damages in a
particular case.  
This Court last addressed the legal framework for setting
the amount of punitive damages in Adams v. Murakami (1991)
54 Cal.3d 105.  In Adams, this Court declined to reach the
argument advanced by a pro-defendant trade association, the
Association for California Tort Reform, advocating “the
profitability of the defendant’s misconduct” as the appropriate
financial measure in fixing punitive damages.  Id. at 116 n.7. 
Now is the time to address that argument.  Since Adams, a
strong consensus has developed that consideration of a
defendant’s illicit profits from its wrongful course of conduct —
something the Legislature explicitly endorsed a quarter century
ago, see Cal. Civil Code § 3295(a)(1) — is important to ensuring
punitive damages are set in a non-arbitrary way which approp-
riately furthers the deterrent function of punitive damages.
Other defendants’ trade associations have adopted this
view; it has been discussed approvingly in several decisions of
the U.S. Supreme Court and the lower California appellate
courts; and substantial law-and-economics literature supports
it.  Indeed even the respondent here, Ford, has adopted this
view.  Just last year, in a California appellate brief filed on
behalf of Ford by the same law firm which represents Ford in
this case, Ford argued for a focus in setting punitive damages
on in-state, illicit profits reaped by a defendant from wrongdoing
in California.  It endorsed such a focus on a defendant’s illicit
profit as “rationally related to the societal objective of deterrence
where the defendant is a corporation.”  Appendix to the attached
amicus brief at 28 (citation omitted).
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For the foregoing reasons, Professor Hylton respectfully
requests permission to file the attached amicus brief.
Respectfully submitted,
________________________________
Michael J. Piuze (Bar # 51342)
LAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL J. PIUZE
11755 Wilshire Bvd., Suite 1170
Los Angeles, California 90025
(310) 312-1102
December 9, 2004 Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
Keith N. Hylton
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Interest of Amicus Curiae
Keith N. Hylton is an economist and law professor at
Boston University, where he teaches torts and antitrust law,
among other subjects.  Professor Hylton has a Ph.D. in
Economics from MIT and a J.D. from Harvard University, and
is a member of the American Law Institute.  Before moving to
Boston University in 1995, Professor Hylton taught at
Northwestern University Law School, where he began his
teaching career in 1989.  Professor Hylton is the author of a
leading textbook on antitrust law and has also published
more than 40 articles in law journals and peer-reviewed law
and economics journals, many of them on the subject of tort
liability.  For a more complete list of his professional
qualifications and publications, see 
http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/profiles/hyltonk.
Professor Hylton files this amicus brief on behalf of
petitioners in this matter, Greg and Jo Ann Johnson, to
address a point argued in the brief of respondent Ford Motor
Company (“Ford Br.”).  Ford urges this Court to rule out, in
the fixing of punitive damages in California, any consideration
of the illicit profits received by a defendant through its
wrongful course of conduct directed at a plaintiff and others
within the state.  In support of this position, Ford makes a
law-and-economics argument that consideration of a
defendant’s illicit profits from a wrongful course of conduct is
not “necessary to achieve appropriate levels of punishment
and deterrence” because, Ford asserts, “substantial economic
literature” shows that “the socially correct level of deterrence
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is created by compelling responsible parties to pay
compensatory damages alone.”  Ford Br. at 36 & n.13.  The
sole authority cited on this point is an article by Professors
Polinsky and Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis
(1998) 111 Harv. L. Rev. 869, 906.
Ford’s analysis is fundamentally mistaken.  There is, in
fact, little if any support in the economic literature for Ford’s
conclusion.  Indeed, the consensus in the economic literature
has been against Ford’s conclusion for at least two centuries. 
Even the Polinsky and Shavell article cited by Ford supports
the conclusion (in portions not cited by Ford) that punitive
damages are socially desirable and that it is important to take
into account a wrongdoer’s illicit profits in a case with the
type of intentionally wrongful conduct involved in this case (as
summarized in the Court of Appeals opinion).  Id. at 874 n.8,
907 n.120, 918 & n.154, 945-47.  Professor Hylton has
analyzed the Polinsky and Shavell article and related
publications dating back to 1764 in two papers, Punitive
Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties (1998) 87 Geo.
L.J. 421, and The Theory of Penalties and The Economics of
Criminal Law (10/04 draft) Law and Economics Working Paper
No. 02-17 (posted at http://www.bu.edu/law/
faculty/papers/pdf_files/HyltonK100702.pdf).
Professor Hylton files this amicus brief to help ensure
this Court understands the error in Ford’s law-and-economics
argument, and to provide the Court with a more complete
view of how law-and-economics principles properly bear on
the consideration of a defendant’s illicit profits from a
1 For example, in the TXO case, the late Dean Griswold
filed an amicus brief on behalf of a major insurance trade
association setting forth a position consistent with the Court’s
ultimate holding:  that punitive damages should be assessed
to “[r]emov[e] the actual or expected gain” from misconduct,
on the basis of “[t]he defendant’s profits from his misconduct
— or, in some cases, the expected profits where the defendant
fails to profit as expected.”  Brief of the American Council of
Life Insurance, et al., as Amici Curiae, in TXO Production Corp.
v. Alliance Resources Corp., No. 92-479, at 15-16.
Also consistent with the approach ultimately adopted by
the Court was the position set out in the Brief of the American
Tort Reform Association, et al., as Amici Curiae in TXO, which
repeatedly underscored that among the factors most relevant
in fixing an appropriately sized punitive damages award is
-3-
wrongful course of conduct in fixing the level of punitive
damages in a particular case.
Introduction and Summary of the Argument
This Court last addressed the legal framework for
setting the amount of punitive damages in Adams v.
Murakami (1991) 54 Cal.3d 105.  In Adams, this Court
declined to reach the argument advanced by the Association
for California Tort Reform advocating “the profitability of the
defendant’s misconduct” as the appropriate financial measure
in fixing punitive damages.  Id. at 116 n.7.  For this argument
to be advanced by such a pro-defendant trade association is
hardly an anomaly.  It appears typical, evidently based on the
sensible assumption that in the setting of punitive damages, a
focus on a defendant’s illicit profits will frequently produce
lower awards than other measures of punitive damages, such
as a focus on a defendant’s wealth.1
“the anticipated or actual gain to the defendant,” id. at 3,
alternatively phrased as “the actual or potential gain to the
defendant.”  Id. at 12. Thus, “the greater the anticipated gain
from a tort, the greater the penalty needed to provide
appropriate disincentives for its commission.”  Id. at 16.
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Indeed, Ford itself argued for a focus in setting punitive
damages on in-state, illicit profits reaped from wrongdoing in
a California appellate brief just last year.  In that brief,
represented by the same law firm as in this case, Ford
endorsed a focus on illicit profits as “rationally related to the
societal objective of deterrence where the defendant is a
corporation.”  Appendix hereto at 28 (citation omitted).
Since this Court decided Adams, other courts in a
significant number of decisions have adopted this approach of
making the profitability of a defendant’s misconduct a key
factor in fixing punitive damages, which helps ensure punitive
damages are set in a non-arbitrary way.  This development
has reinforced the rationality of the Legislature’s 1979
statutory recognition that illicit profits should be considered
in setting the proper amount of “damages for the sake of
example and by way of punishing the defendant.”  Cal. Civil
Code § 3294(a).  See Cal. Civil Code § 3295(a)(1) (noting
relevance of “[t]he profits the defendant has gained by virtue
of the wrongful course of conduct of the nature and type
shown by the evidence.”).  Among these decisions:
! In upholding the punitive damages award in Pacific
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip (1991) 499 U.S. 1, the U.S.
Supreme Court approved the consideration under Alabama
law of “the profitability to the defendant of the wrongful
-5-
conduct and the desirability of removing that profit and of
having the defendant also sustain a loss.”  Id. at 22.  
! In BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore (1996) 517 U.S. 559,
three justices (whose votes were essential to the result of the
case) explicitly endorsed this “profitability factor” of Alabama
punitive damages law for having “the ability to limit awards to
a fixed, rational amount” — for example, in that case, through
a focus on “the $56,000 in profits evidenced in the record”
which the defendant had received from its fraudulent sale of a
repainted car to the plaintiff, and from its 13 other fraudulent
sales to other persons in Alabama.  Id. at 591.   
! In TXO Prod.Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp. (1993)
509 U.S. 443 (plurality opinion), the Court focused on the
“substantial” royalties the defendant had sought to obtain by
acting “in bad faith,” id. at 450-51 & n.10, estimating that the
$10 million punitive damages award was less than ten times
the royalties the defendant had illicitly sought to obtain.  Id.
at 461-62.
! In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group,
Inc. (2001) 532 U.S. 424, the Court endorsed setting punitive
damages by reference to the “anticipated gross profits . . .
attributable to [defendant’s] misconduct,” as long as such
profits are not estimated using “unrealistic” assumptions.  Id.
at 442 (internal quotations omitted).
! In Cummings Medical Corp. v. Occupational Medical
Corp. of America, Inc. (2d Dist. 1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1291
(rev. den. Jan. 28, 1993), the Second District noted that “[t]he
defendant’s profits from misconduct are objectively based and
-6-
uniquely appropriate as the basis for punitive damages,” that
using punitive damages to remove a defendant’s profit “sends
a clear signal to defendants that such misconduct does not
pay,” and that “[a] punitive damages award specifically
tailored to this objective can never be ‘excessive.’”  Id. at 1299-
1300.
! In Vallbona v. Springer (4th Dist. 1996) 43 Cal.App.4th
1525, 1539-41 & n.19, the Fourth District relied on the
Cummings analysis to uphold $200,000 in punitive damages
based on evidence that defendants had “fraudulently obtained
about $300,000 from” the roughly 120 people subjected to the
bogus cellulite-removal laser treatment program under which
the three plaintiffs were defrauded.
As a matter of law and economics, amicus strongly
concurs in the position Ford took last year (see Appendix), a
position reflected in these and other decisions, that in fixing
an amount of punitive damages it is rational to focus on the
illicit profits received by an offender from a wrongful course of
conduct.  Amicus strongly disagrees with the contrary position
Ford has now taken in this Court, based on an inaccurate
summary of the law-and-economics literature.  Ford Br. at 36
& n.13.  Effective deterrence of profit-motivated intentional
wrongdoing requires that exemplary damages should
routinely be set at no less than the amount needed to strip
away the actual or expected profits from the wrongdoing and
thus reduce the “expected gain” from such wrongdoing to zero
or below zero, thereby deterring such wrongdoing in the
future.  For courts to reduce punitive damages awards below
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this level would in effect override the Legislature’s
commitment to the use of exemplary damages to accomplish
general deterrence of intentional wrongdoing, Cal. Civil Code 
§ 3294(a), and its explicit endorsement of consideration of
illicit profits in Cal. Civil Code § 3295(a)(1).
Argument
This brief will first describe the basic framework for
what level of punishment is needed to achieve “complete
deterrence” of intentional wrongdoing, drawing on analysis
which has been broadly accepted for more than two centuries. 
Second, it will describe the assumptions about this case upon
which this brief’s economic analysis is based, drawing on the
Court of Appeals opinion.  Third, using the facts of this case
to illustrate the relevant principles, it will more precisely
describe how, in a particular case, a punitive damages award
sufficient to achieve deterrence by stripping away illicit profits
should be calculated.
I. Deterrence Theory Provides a Useful Framework 
for Evaluating the Size of a Punitive Damages Award
As the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized, deterrence
theory drawn from the law-and-economics literature can
provide a useful framework for evaluating the size of a
punitive damages award to determine whether it is excessive
on the record of a particular case.  See Cooper Industries, Inc.
v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. (2001) 532 U.S. 424, 438-40;
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore (1996) 517 U.S. 559, 592-93
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(Breyer, J., joined by O’Connor and Souter, JJ., concurring). 
The reason is that the main purpose for imposing punitive
damages is to deter the defendant and others from engaging
in socially harmful conduct in the future, by making an
example of the defendant to show the consequence of its
wrongdoing, hence the original name, “exemplary damages.”
Of course, the appropriate amount of punitive or
exemplary damages in a given case is not limited to the
amount adequate to produce general deterrence of such
conduct in the future, because “deterrence is not the only
purpose served by punitive damages.   . . .   ‘[C]itizens and
legislators may rightly insist that they are willing to tolerate
some loss in economic efficiency in order to deter what they
consider morally offensive conduct, albeit cost-beneficial
morally offensive conduct; efficiency is just one consideration
among many.’”   Cooper Industries, 532 U.S. at 439-40
(quoting Galanter & Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages
and Legal Pluralism (1993) 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1393, 1450).
Deterrence theory, then, is merely a vehicle for
assessing the minimum amount of punitive damages
appropriate in a case.  Given the importance of deterrence in
the desired function of punitive damages, the proper approach
to understanding deterrence theory in the context of punitive
damages is to start with an examination of the theory of
penalties.
2 For general discussions of the theory of penalties and
related issues, see, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, The Theory of
Penalties and The Economics of Criminal Law (10/04 draft)
Law and Economics Working Paper No. 02-17 (posted at
http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/papers/pdf_files/
HyltonK100702.pdf); Tracey L. Meares, Neal Katyal & Dan M.
Kahan, Updating the Study of Punishment (2004) 56 Stan. L.
Rev. 1171, 1172-80; William L. Barnes, Jr., Revenge on
Utilitarianism: Renouncing a Comprehensive Economic Theory of
Crime and Punishment (1999) 74 Ind. L.J. 627; Neal Kumar
Katyal, Deterrence’s Difficulty (1997) 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2385;
Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions:  The Middleground
Between Criminal and Civil Law (1992) 101 Yale L.J. 1795;
Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the
Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy (1990) 1990 Duke
L.J. 1.
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A. The Theory of Penalties in General
The theory of penalties aims to discover “optimal” levels
of penalties.    An optimal penalty avoids two significant types
of costs:   underdeterrence and overdeterrence.  
Underdeterrence results when penalties are so low that they
fail to deter actors from engaging in conduct that is socially
harmful.  Overdeterrence results when penalties are so high
that they force potential injurers or offenders to take
precautions that are on balance socially harmful, or to forgo
engaging in socially desirable activities. For example, if the
fear of tort damages (a type of penalty) for medical malpractice
forces hospitals to close their emergency wards, one might
view this as an example of a penalty having substantial
overdeterrence costs.2
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B. Early History: "An Eye for an Eye" — Limiting
Penalties to Avoid Lengthy Cycles of Revenge 
Before the formation of the modern administrative state,
penalties appear to have been designed largely to guard
against the danger of ad hoc retribution, meted out by clan
against clan, family against family, escalating and resulting in
lengthy cycles of revenge.  Primitive and early societies
typically had “no officials to take action against murder, theft,
and other coercive acts — no police, judges, prosecutors, or
jailers.”  Richard A. Posner, Retribution and Related Concepts
of Punishment (1980) 9 J. Legal Stud. 71, 76.  Yet they did
“have norms against murder, theft, and other unjustified uses
of force,” norms which were enforced though “the possibility
of retaliation by victim against aggressor,” usually with help
from the victim’s family or broader group.  Id. at 76-77.
In such primitive societies there developed the principle
of “the lex talionis of early Roman law,” and “the ‘eye for an
eye’ precept in the Old Testament (and a virtually identical
precept in the Koran), and in many other early codes . . . .” 
Id. at 71.  This principle supplanted “the ancient practices of
indiscriminate personal revenge,” in which “[t]he measure of
retaliation — left to the discretion of the victim’s clan (subject
to its strength) — was generally greater than the harm
suffered,” often as much as “a sevenfold retaliation.” 
Francesco Parisi, The Genesis of Liability in Ancient Law (2001)
3 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 82, 86.
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Under the principle of the lex talionis, “the punishment
is usually made equivalent to the crime, sometimes with
distressing literalness.”  Posner, supra, 9 J. Legal Stud. at 
81.  As Posner explains, this retribution principle functioned 
as a substitute for or limitation on vengeance.  The
idea is that without some customary or legal
constraints, people might react to a wrong by
retaliating against the wrongdoer disproportionally
and, especially when this is so, the original
wrongdoer or his family might in turn retaliate
against the original retaliator or his family.   To
avoid an endless cycle of injury, retaliation, and
counter-retaliation — a costly system for
controlling aggression — custom may prescribe
that the retaliator may inflict no more severe
injury than the wrong (e.g., a tooth for a tooth
rather than an eye for a tooth) and that the
wrongdoer may not seek vengeance against the
retaliator in turn.  Retribution in this view is in
part a limitation on the severity of punishment
under a pure system of retaliation . . . .
Id. at 82.  See also Parisi, supra, 3 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. at 87
(the lex talionis replaced a system of discretionary retaliation
in which “partisan bias” risked triggering “spirals of escalating
violence”); id. at 95, 98-100 (“the lex talionis created an
express and well-defined punitive rule” which rendered “the
expected sanction fully known to the wrongdoer’s group,”
which “served as a coordination mechanism that reduced the
risk of feuds resulting from the parties’ disagreement over the
measure of legitimate retaliation”); Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare (2001) 114 Harv. L. Rev. 961,
1282-84.
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With the rise of the modern administrative state,
coupling a monopoly on legitimate violence with elaborate
procedural protections, id. at 1284, the predicate for insisting
on a principle of proportional retaliation long ago vanished. 
Thus, we observe “[i]n a modern system of punishment” that
“there need be no exact correspondence between the gravity of
the crime and the severity of the punishment (a less serious
crime might be punished more severely than a more serious
crime if the former were easier to conceal) . . . .”  Posner,
supra, 9 J. Legal Stud. at 81-82.  See also Kaplow & Shavell,
supra, 114 Harv. L. Rev. at 1300 (“actual punishment is
substantially higher than retributive principles would seem to
require or permit when there is a low probability of
apprehension, such as there is for many common categories
of crime, for which the probability often is only one or two
percent.”)  E.g., Joseph B. Treaster, “Insurer Agrees to Pay
Penalty in Fraud Case,” N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 2003, at C1
(insurer AIG forced to forfeit $100,000 in illicit profits received
for helping a company defraud its investors, plus a fine of 100
times that amount, $10 million).
Because of the long history during which the observance
of proportional limits on retaliation was important to social
order, “it would not be surprising that everyone, . . . would be
inclined to find the retributive conception of fair punishment
intuitively appealing.”  Kaplow & Shavell, supra, 114 Harv. L.
Rev. at 1287.  However, despite its intuitive appeal, “it would
make no sense” to apply this conception developed in
primitive times to limit the penalties otherwise found
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appropriate to increase the well-being of all members of
modern society.  Id. at 1288.  “Thus, it may often be desirable
to employ higher punishments than those called for under the
proportionality principle.”  Id. at 1290.  An understanding of
economic principles coupled with an understanding of “the
origins and functions of retribution as a social norm makes
clear that there is no good reason for treating our intuitions
about retribution as if they constituted an independent basis
for” limiting the punishment found to be appropriate to
improve the welfare of members of society.  Id.
C. The Beccaria-Bentham Approach:  Penalties 
Should be Set to Eliminate the Offender’s Gain
“The economic study of punishment is almost as old as
(modern) economics itself.”  Posner, supra, 9 J. Legal Stud. at
73.  The first modern contribution to the theory of penalties
came in the eighteenth century in treatments by Italian
economist and criminologist Cesare Beccaria, and by English
economist and philosopher Jeremy Bentham.  See Cesare
Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments (1764) (Henry Paolucci
ed., Bobbs-Merrill 1963); Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to
the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1781) (Prometheus
Books 1998).  They articulated the principle that penalties
should be set to eliminate the offender’s gain from the offense,
which in principle should be sufficient to deter the offense. 
This is the central operative principle behind deterrence
theory; all later theoretical constructs are simply variations or
elaborations upon it.
-14-
The essence of Beccaria’s approach was rather simple: 
penalties should be set at a level that eliminates the gain to
the offender, but not much above that level.  Beccaria at 43-
44.  Setting penalties high enough to eliminate gain, Beccaria
believed, will completely deter intentional harmful conduct. 
On the other hand, Beccaria believed, penalties should be
limited to the amount adequate to deter wrongdoing because
harsh punishments may by example, in a sense, teach people
to act violently and with little regard for the feelings of others. 
Id. at 44.  At the time, Beccaria’s ideas were startling, but
they generated a movement toward more lenient and
individualized punishment in many European countries, and
many of his ideas became widely adopted during his lifetime. 
E.g., Francis A. Allen, A Matter of Proportion (2001) 4 Green
Bag 2d 343, 344; Leon Radzinowicz (1948) 1 A History of
English Criminal Law and Its Administration From 1750, at 278
n.38.  Indeed, Beccaria’s ideas became so influential his
original insights now appear trivial.  Coleman Phillipson
(1970) Three Criminal Law Reformers:   Beccaria, Bentham,
Romily at 84.
Bentham, who spent a good part of his career
addressing issues Beccaria had touched on, adopted
Beccaria’s formula that the penalty should be set at a level
that eliminates the offender’s prospect of gain.  Bentham,
supra, at 179.  Bentham’s major practical innovation was the
introduction of a concern about “marginal deterrence” — a
concern that having excessively high penalties for relatively
minor offenses might encourage an offender, in the process of
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committing an offense, to commit a more harmful act which
carried the same, or only slightly harsher, punishment.  Id. at
168.  For example, imposing the death penalty for purse-
snatchers might well encourage the purse-snatcher to kill his
victim, both to take the purse with less effort and to eliminate
a witness, as committing this additional wrong would not add
to the penalty imposed.  
Bentham’s concern about marginal deterrence — about
the need to deter offenders from “stepping up” their offense
because of a lack of concern for additional consequences —
led Bentham to join Beccaria in reasoning that penalties
should not be set appreciably above the level adequate to
remove the offender’s prospect of gain from an offense.  By
keeping penalties moderate, Bentham’s view was that society
could reserve room for imposing additional penalties on
offenders who step up to higher levels of misconduct,
therefore hopefully deterring those offenses at the margin.  Id.
at 181. 
Another important innovation made by Bentham was
his suggestion that where the probability of punishment of an
offender is low, penalties may need to be increased to offset
the dilution of deterrence that results when an offender
realizes that the probability of the gain-stripping penalty
actually being imposed is remote.  Id. at 181-84.  See A. Mitch
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic
Analysis (1998) 111 Harv. L. Rev. 869, 876 n.12.
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D. The Becker Caveat: Sometimes Imposing 
Penalties Which Merely Internalize the Cost
to Others Leads to a Socially Optimal Result
The Beccaria-Bentham approach to the theory of
penalties, often termed the “classical deterrence” approach,
was essentially the sole basis of deterrence theory until 1968,
which saw the publication by economist Gary S. Becker of
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach (1968) 76 J.
Pol. Econ. 169.  Becker’s theory of sanctions offered in this
article was an important contribution, being responsible in
part for Becker being awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in
1992.  For our purposes, Becker’s approach applied, in
essence, a caveat to the Beccaria-Bentham approach to
stripping the gains from an offender for an offense.  Becker
suggested that rather than focusing on eliminating any
prospect of gain by offenders, punishment should aim at
ensuring that offenders internalize all social costs of their
offense.  This is often termed the “cost internalization”
approach to punishment.
The most important aspect of Becker’s analysis, as to
which it functions as a caveat to the Beccaria-Bentham
approach, lies in areas where the offense involved is not
viewed as a particularly serious one, and there are large gains
to the offender and very little harm to the victim of the
offense, so that imposing a penalty which merely forces the
offender to absorb the cost to the victim and permits the
offender to go forward may lead to a result where society is
better off.  
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As an example of how Becker’s approach would work in
practice, consider the case of Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc.,
563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997).  There, during the winter the
defendant needed to deliver a mobile home to a parcel of land. 
The easiest way to do it was simply to haul the mobile home
across a narrow strip of land owned by the Jacques, to the
parcel of land.  The only other way was to haul the mobile
home down a long, winding road, which could only be done
after removing at least seven feet of snow covering parts of it. 
But the Jacques refused permission to use their land,
evidently out of the mistaken belief that granting permission
might impair their property rights under the law of adverse
possession.  If the cost of delivering the mobile home down a
snow-filled, long, winding road were $5,000, and the injury to
the Jacques of moving it across their land were $100, the
Becker approach would permit the trespass and impose only
a $100 penalty, to force the defendant to internalize the cost
to the Jacques, thereby permitting the defendant to keep the
$4,900 gain, and by permitting this more efficient delivery of
the mobile home, making society better off.
Becker made clear, however, that his approach is only
properly applicable where the gain to the offender exceeds the
harm to society of the offense (as in the above example). 
Where the harm to society imposed by an offense exceeds the
gain to the offender, Becker’s approach agrees with the view of 
Beccaria and Bentham that the optimal approach is to
completely remove any incentive to commit the offense by
stripping the offender of his expectation of gain (gain-stripping
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penalty).  Indeed, in such an instance, the Becker approach
leads to a higher punishment than the Beccaria-Bentham
approach:  Beccaria and Bentham would only remove the gain
to the offender, but Becker would force the offender to pay an
amount equal to the cost to society, an even higher amount.  
Because the “cost internalization” approach is more
effective than even the Beccaria-Bentham approach in
deterring offenses where the cost to society exceeds the gain
to the offender, Becker urged that the “cost internalization”
approach should be the general policy toward punishment. 
Another reason Becker recommended this approach is
administrative simplicity.  The internalizing penalty is
administratively easy to apply because it does not require the
enforcement authority to determine whether the offender’s
gain is less than society’s loss — all it need do is determine
the cost to society, and force the offender to pay that cost. 
E. The Posner Clarification:  Except Where a
Market Mechanism Is Available to Attain The
Same Result, If It Is Indeed Socially Optimal
The next important contribution to the theory of
penalties was Richard A. Posner’s An Economic Theory of
Criminal Law (1985) 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1193.  The key
contribution of Posner was to introduce the role of the market
in the design of penalties for deterrence purposes.  In
particular, Posner introduced a needed clarification to the
Becker “cost internalization” approach in situations where the
result which the offender seeks to achieve can be achieved
through a market transaction with his victim, if indeed it is
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the socially optimal result, rather than through forcible
imposition on the victim.
Posner suggested that penalties should be set at the
gain-stripping, or complete deterrence, level whenever the
offender had the option, at low cost, of entering into a
consensual transaction for whatever good or entitlement he
sought from the victim.  Id. at 1195-96, 1201-03.  Gain
stripping makes sense whenever a consensual transaction is
available as an alternative, because potential offenders should
be encouraged, in most cases, to use the market rather than
take things from victims.  In particular, if the transaction cost
of using the market is lower than the cost of enforcing the law
against an offender, then society’s costs are held to the lowest
level by forcing potential offenders into the market whenever
consensual transactions are a relatively inexpensive means of
transferring entitlements.  As Posner explains: “Market
bypassing in such situations is inefficient — in the sense in
which economists equate efficiency with wealth maximization
— no matter how much utility it may confer on the offender.” 
Id. at 1195.
The effect of Posner’s clarification can be illustrated by
returning to the example of Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc.,
involving the delivery of a mobile home during a snowy
Wisconsin winter.  Under Becker’s “cost internalization”
approach, the defendant should be permitted to trespass over
the Jacques’ land, even after the Jacques refused permission,
and the only penalty to the defendant should be the $100 cost
to the Jacques (plus the cost to society of enforcing that
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sanction), with the defendant keeping the remainder of the
$5,000 in profit, on the theory that permitting this offense
rather than imposing a penalty that offsets the entire profit
makes society better off.
Under the principle articulated by Posner, however, the
penalty imposed on the defendant should not be capped by
the “cost internalization” approach.  Rather, the penalty
imposed should be calculated to remove any hope of profit
from such an intentional trespass, applying a “complete
deterrence” or “classical deterrence” approach, to force the
defendant to use the market and bargain with the Jacques
over a price to be permitted to use the land, and thereby
divide the profit to be gained by using the Jacques’ land.  To
use a “cost internalization” approach to cap punishment,
Posner would argue, would merely encourage people to
intentionally violate the rights of others, rather than bargain
with them, ultimately making society worse off.  
The result reached by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in
Jacques, upholding a $100,000 punitive damages award
against the defendant for intentional trespass, even though
there was no evidence of harm to the Jacques as reflected in
the $1 nominal damages award, illustrates the logic and
wisdom of the Posner clarification to Becker’s approach. 
There the Wisconsin Supreme Court emphasized that
“punitive damages must be in excess of the profit created by
the misconduct so that the defendant recognizes a loss.”  563
N.W.2d at 165.  See also Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages
3 There are other theoretical grounds for reaching the
result advocated by Posner, that in any situation where the
market is an alternative to the offender committing an offense
against the victim for profit, the optimal penalty aims to
completely deter, to force actors into the market, by stripping
the offender’s expectation of gain.  One could just as easily
reach this conclusion by carefully considering the costs of
excessive penalties and the costs of inadequate penalties.  See
Hylton, supra, 87 Geo. L J. at 430-39.  Another approach
which supports the same conclusion is found in the literature
that stresses the “secondary costs” (e.g., costs of avoidance
and self-protective efforts) generated by intentional offensive
conduct.  See Fred S. McChesney, Boxed In:  Economists and
Benefits from Crime (1993) 13 International Rev. Law & Econ.
225; Richard L. Hasen & Richard H. McAdams, The
Surprisingly Complex Case Against Theft (1997) 17
International Rev. Law & Econ. 367.  For an application of the
secondary-costs theory to punitive damages, see David D.
Haddock, Fred S. McChesney, & Menahem Spiegel (1990) An
Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary Legal Sanctions,
78 Calif. L. Rev. 1.
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and the Economic Theory of Penalties (1998) 87 Geo. L.J. 421,
445-46.3
The fundamental principle supported by Posner’s
approach, one quite relevant to this case (see Part II, below),
is that whenever an honest transaction in the market is
available as an alternative to simply taking something by force
or fraud, penalties should be set to strongly encourage the
honest market transaction.  The framework presented here is
consistent with that of Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: 
One View of the Cathedral (1972) 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089.  The
famous Calabresi-Melamed framework holds that “property
rules,” which prevent violations by stripping gains, are
4 For an analysis of this point applied to the area of
punitive damages, see Robert D. Cooter, Prices and Sanctions
(1983) 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1523.  See also Uri Gneezy & Aldo
Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price (2000) 29 J. Legal Stud. 1; Robert
Cooter, Models of Morality in Law and Economics: Self-Control
and Self-Improvement for the “Bad Man” of Holmes (1998) 78
B.U. L. Rev. 903, 914-19; Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and
Economics (1998) 27 J. Legal Stud. 585. 
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appropriate whenever transaction costs are low; and “liability
rules,” which internalize costs, are appropriate when
transaction costs are high.  See generally Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An
Economic Analysis (1996) 109 Harv. L. Rev. 713.  
One function of punitive damages is to maintain the
distinction between property rules and liability rules — or,
equivalently, to prevent property rules from being converted
into liability rules.  Punitive damages set at a level high
enough to remove the profit from a wrongful course of
conduct are essential to deterring potential wrongdoers from
turning the rules against fraud and other intentional wrongs
from sanctions strictly prohibiting certain conduct into mere
“prices” for engaging in the conduct, amounting to simply a
“cost of doing business.”4  Setting the penalty higher than
necessary to accomplish this purpose is not socially costly
unless there is substantial uncertainty over whether the
offender’s conduct is properly labeled as wrongful, or over
whether the offender in fact committed the wrong.
5  E.g., Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the
Law of Punitive Damages (1982) 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1; Robert D.
Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages (1982) 56 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 79; Gary T. Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment
in the Common Law of Punitive Damages: A Comment (1982) 56
S. Cal. L. Rev. 133; Jason S. Johnston, Punitive Liability: A
New Paradigm for Efficiency in Tort Law (1987) 87 Colum. L.
Rev. 1385; Dan B. Dobbs, Ending Punishment in “Punitive”
Damages: Deterrence-Measured Remedies (1989) 40 Ala. L.
Rev. 831; David D. Friedman, An Economic Explanation of
Punitive Damages (1989) 40 Ala. L. Rev. 1125; Robert D.
Cooter, Punitive Damages for Deterrence: When and How
Much? (1989) 40 Ala. L. Rev. 1143; David D. Haddock, Fred S.
McChesney & Menahem Spiegel, An Ordinary Economic
Rationale for Extraordinary Legal Sanctions (1990) 78 Cal. L.
Rev. 1; Richard Craswell, Damage Multipliers in Market
Relationships (1996) 25 J. Legal. Stud. 463; Paul H. Rubin,
John E. Calfee, & Mark F. Grady, BMW v. Gore: Mitigating the
Punitive Economics of Punitive Damages (1997) 5 Sup. Ct.
Econ. Rev. 179; Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages, Social
Norms, and Economic Analysis (1997) 60 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 73; Mark F. Grady, Efficient Negligence (1998) 87 Geo.
L.J. 397; Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic
Theory of Penalties (1998) 87 Geo. L.J. 421; Jane Mallor &
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F. The Polinsky-Shavell View of Punitive Damages
Corroborating the Posner Approach, and 
Explicating the Application of the Becker 
“Cost Internalization” Approach in the Tort Field
A substantial body of law-and-economics analysis of
punitive damages has developed in recent years, based in part
on the Beccaria-Bentham approach to penalties, generally
adopting as a starting assumption that one objective of
punitive damages should be to deter offenders by imposing
penalties sufficient to offset the gain to an offender (either
monetary or non-monetary) from acts deemed socially
wrongful, thereby deterring like acts in the future.5  An
Barry Roberts, Punitive Damages:  Toward a Principled
Approach (1999) 50 Hastings L.J. 969; Richard Craswell,
Deterrence and Damages:  The Multiplier Principle and its
Alternatives (1999) 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2185.
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important exception is a law review article published by
Stanford economist and law professor A. Mitch Polinsky and
by Harvard economist and law professor Steven Shavell,
Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis (1998) 111 Harv. L.
Rev. 869.  This is the article relied on by Ford in its brief to
this Court in arguing that “substantial economic literature”
supposedly shows that there is little need for punitive
damages because “the socially correct level of deterrence is
created by compelling responsible parties to pay
compensatory damages alone.”  Ford Br. at 36 & n.13.
The Polinsky and Shavell article does not support this
conclusion.  What the article in fact focuses on is spelling out
the implications for punitive damages of the Becker “cost
internalization” approach to penalties, under which generally
the offender’s gain from the offense is not a relevant aspect of
the analysis.  However, like Posner, Polinsky and Shavell
recognize an important caveat to the Becker approach which
makes their analysis largely irrelevant to a case such as this,
as this case involves an intentional tort by Ford committed
against the Johnsons and many other California consumers
pursuant to official corporate fraud policy (see Part II, below).  
Polinsky and Shavell explicitly recognize in their article
that where “a reprehensible act is purely intentional,
overdeterrence,” the central concern of their article, “cannot
6 If a plaintiff can “actually prove[] in court” that a
corporation has “engaged in a pattern of misconduct, of which
any given case is merely illustrative,” then the “cases of
corporate wrongdoing [that] are brought to light . . . might be
punished all the more severely in order to offset corporate
gain from undiscovered cases.   * * *   In that case, the entire
course of misconduct rightly may be considered.”  Kenneth S.
Abraham & John C. Jeffries, Jr., Punitive Damages and the
Rule of Law: The Role of Defendant’s Wealth (1989) 18 J. Legal
Stud. 415, 420. Compare Roth v. Farner-Bocken Co.  (S.D.
2003) 667 N.W.2d 651, 667-69 (“no evidence that the conduct
reflected a company policy or practice,” and thus no evidence
of potential harm to other victims that might result if similar
future behavior were not deterred, based on the
dangerousness inherent in defendant’s conduct).  See also
Vallbona v. Springer (4th Dist. 1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1525,
1539-41 & n.19; Hawkins v. Allstate Ins. Co. (Ariz. 1987) 733
P.2d 1073, 1080-81, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 874; Jane Mallor &
Barry Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled
Approach (1999) 50 Hastings L.J. 969, 997; Hylton, supra, 87
Geo. L.J. at 431-33, 458; David D. Haddock, Fred S.
McChesney & Menahem Spiegel, An Ordinary Economic
Rationale for Extraordinary Legal Sanctions (1990) 78 Calif. L.
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occur,” and therefore the logical social objective is one of
“deterring such acts completely.”  Id. at 906-07 & n.120; see
also id. at 874 n.8, 918 & n.154, 945-47.  That objective, they
state, warrants “a measure of damages equal to the greater of
gain or harm.”  Id. at 918 n.154 (emphasis added).  Under the
“complete deterrence” or “classical deterrence” approach,
which Polinsky and Shavell accept in the context of an
intentional tort, the objective is to deter such intentional
wrongdoing by removing completely the offender’s prospect of
gain from a wrongful course of conduct, which of course
makes it important to consider the defendant’s profit from a
wrongful course of conduct.6
Rev. 1, 13, 18; Dan B. Dobbs, Ending Punishment in ‘Punitive’
Damages: Deterrence-Measured Remedies (1989) 40 Ala. L.
Rev. 831, 866-67, 874-88.
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Of course, in the context of imposing punitive damages
for wrongful acts by a defendant falling short of an intentional
tort, the approach of Polinsky and Shavell represents an
important advance in analysis of the “cost internalization”
approach.  In such a case, Polinsky and Shavell argue, total
damages should be determined by dividing the actual harm
(or compensatory damages) by the probability that the
offender will be found liable when he should be.  If the total
damage award is equal to the actual harm divided by the
probability of the defendant being found liable, then the total
award effectively makes the offender pay for all of the costs he
imposes on society, because it forces the offender to pay for
those cases in which he “gets away” without being held liable
for his conduct.  Id. at 889-90.  The punitive damages portion
of the award, under this algorithm, is simply the difference
between this measure of total damages and the actual harm. 
For example, if the offender imposes a loss of $100 on each of
his victims but is held liable in only one out of every three
such instances, then the total damages award in that one
case should be $300:  the $100 in compensatory damages 
plus $200 in punitive damages.  In a regime in which some
offenses escape liability, the Polinsky and Shavell algorithm
guarantees full internalization of victim losses.
From the context of their article, and their explicit
exclusion from their analysis of intentional torts, it is clear
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that the “cost internalization” approach to punitive damages
urged by Polinsky and Shavell should be followed only when
the offender has not evaded the market (i.e., a market
transaction is difficult to arrange, as in most accident
settings) and the offender’s gain is likely to be greater than
society’s loss.  Thus, like Posner’s approach, the approach of
Polinsky and Shavell would not excuse the trespass that
occurred in Jacque v. Steenberg Homes.  
An example of where the “cost internalization” approach
of Polinsky and Shavell would properly work to cap a punitive
damages award is a case in which an employee or agent of a
firm steals from a customer, in violation of the firm’s policies
but while acting within the scope of employment.  Consider,
for example, an insurance agent who steals customers’
premium payments rather than remitting them to the insurer,
as in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1
(1991).  Since the agent has committed a theft, any damage
award against him alone should aim, at a minimum, to strip
his gain.  The damage award against the insurer, however,
should be limited by the “cost internalization” principle.  The
reason is that the firm itself has not adopted a policy of theft. 
The firm itself, on which the punitive damages award is being
imposed, did not commit the intentional tort.  In order to
provide the right incentives for the firm to monitor its
employees (and in some cases agents), it may be necessary to
set total damages at a level which divides the actual harm by
the probability the defendant firm will be successfully sued
and held liable when it should be.  The punitive damages in
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Haslip, which apparently were four times the compensatory
damages, are thus defensible assuming there was perhaps
only a one in five chance the insurer would be successfully
sued.  To award higher punitive damages might create
overdeterrence, forcing firms to make wasteful expenditures
in monitoring the activity of all employees and agents,
presumably nearly all of whom are honest, to guard against
massive punitive damages being imposed merely because of
the isolated acts of a single errant employee or agent, a fear
which would in the end make society worse off.  Daniel R.
Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime (1996) 25 J. Legal
Stud. 319, 348.  See generally Richard Craswell & John E.
Calfee (1986) Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.
L. Econ. & Org. 279.  
On the other hand, as Polinsky and Shavell recognize,
and as much recent scholarship corroborates, see note 5,
supra, in a case involving an intentional tort or other
intentional, reprehensible wrongdoing by the defendant, it is
appropriate under deterrence theory to seek to completely
deter such acts by eliminating any prospect that the offender
will gain from them.  Here, the primary concern of the penalty
designer should be to make sure that the penalty is not so low
that it fails to deter harmful conduct.  Overdeterrence is not a
concern because the reason for gain stripping is to totally
deter or eradicate the injurer’s conduct, not to constrain it to
some “optimal” level that leaves room for conduct that
potentially has social value.  It follows that for intentional
wrongdoing, the punitive component of a damages award
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should be no less than the amount necessary to strip the
offender of profits obtained from wrongful conduct.
TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509
U.S. 443 (1993), provides a good illustration of the proper
application of the theory of penalties discussed thus far.   
Geologists employed by TXO determined that recovery of oil
and gas under a roughly 1000-acre tract of land known as the
“Blevins Tract” would be profitable.  They recommended that
the company acquire the rights to develop the oil and gas
under the tract.  The owner of those rights was Alliance
Resources Corporation.  TXO made an offer that Alliance
considered “phenomenal.”  Alliance accepted the offer, and
assigned its interest in the Blevins Tract to TXO in exchange
for a payment and a share of future royalties from the oil and
gas produced from the tract.
Having acquired this prized acreage by promising
phenomenal royalties, TXO then promptly launched a series
of fraudulent efforts, which included attempting to suborn
perjury, designed to suggest to Alliance it had not passed
good title, but instead that TXO had obtained title through
another chain of title, all in an effort to trick or coerce Alliance
into forfeiting much of its bargained-for royalty interest. 
When Alliance refused to capitulate, TXO filed a declaratory
judgment action in an effort to establish, based on evidence it
knew was fraudulent, that Alliance did not have title.  Alliance
counterclaimed for slander of title.  The jury ruled for
Alliance, finding that TXO had slandered Alliance’s title, and
it awarded Alliance $19,000 in compensatory damages (its
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attorneys’ fees for defeating the declaratory judgment action)
and $10 million in punitive damages.  
The “cost internalization” approach would require the
court to divide Alliance’s loss, $19,000, by the probability,
assessed at the time of its wrongdoing, that TXO would be
successfully sued and held liable.  The probability that TXO
would be held liable is the product of the probability that
Alliance would file suit and the probability that the court
would find in favor of Alliance.  Since both probabilities were
high, the Polinsky and Shavell approach suggests the optimal
punitive damages award in TXO, if the “cost internalization”
approach were proper for that case, would have been a very
small multiple of the $19,000 in compensatory damages.
How, then, does one explain, relying on economic
principles of optimal deterrence, the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision upholding punitive damages of 526 times that
amount?  The explanation is that, as Polinsky and Shavell
note in their article, the “cost internalization” approach does
not apply where the defendant has committed an intentional
wrong against the plaintiff for illicit benefit — here, TXO’s
effort by fraud to obtain all or much of the lucrative stream of
royalties TXO had promised to pay Alliance.  Instead, the
“complete deterrence” or “classical deterrence” approach
should be used to remove any incentive for members of
society to commit such wrongs.  
Thus, the Court properly upheld the $10 million
punitive damages award in full after concluding that although
TXO did not actually receive any illicit profits (as its scheme
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was quickly thwarted), it had expected to realize substantial
profits through its fraud.  Suggesting that Alliance’s estimate
that TXO anticipated illicit profits of $8.3 million might be too
high, the Court held that the $10 million punitive damages
award was defensible even if TXO had only anticipated $1
million in illicit profits, TXO, 509 U.S. at 450-51 n.10, 459-62
(plurality opinion), particularly given “the possible harm to
other victims that might have resulted if similar future
behavior were not deterred.”  Id. at 460.  The result in TXO
strongly corroborates the logic and wisdom of applying a
“complete deterrence” or “classical deterrence” approach to
profit-motivated corporate misconduct.
II. Based on the Court of Appeals’ Analysis, This
Is a Typical Case Calling for Punitive Damages
to Be Set at a Level Sufficient to Eliminate Any
Expectation of Profit From an Intentionally 
Tortious, Wrongful Course of Conduct
That the traditional “complete deterrence” or “classical
deterrence” approach, not the alternate “cost internalization”
approach, is the proper one for this case appears evident from
the following aspects of the Court of Appeals’ opinion.
First, as the Court of Appeals found, this is a case
involving “intentional fraud” against consumers.  Opinion at
7; see also Opinion at 11 (defendant was “engaged in a
scheme to defraud consumers”).  As the court stated:  “Such
intentional conduct is highly reprehensible.”  Id. at 13.  This
is important because only where the misconduct involved is of
the sort which society regards as never acceptable at any level
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(as compared with, for example, mere negligence, or a breach
of a contract obligation) is it economically appropriate to set
the penalty for an infraction high enough to deter all such
misconduct. Applying such a framework to less serious
misconduct might chill conduct that has social value.  
Fraud like Ford’s has no social value.  Thus society’s
objective is and should be to deter such intentional wrong-
doing completely, by removing any incentive to engage in it. 
As Judge Easterbrook has aptly noted:  “The optimal amount
of fraud is zero . . . .”  Ackerman v. Schwartz (7th Cir. 1991)
947 F.2d 841, 847.  See Richard S. Gruner, Just Punishment
and Adequate Deterrence for Organizational Misconduct: 
Scaling Economic Penalties Under the New Corporate
Sentencing Guidelines (1992) 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 225, 235.
Second, the misconduct involved was not the result of
errant actions by low-level employees acting in pursuit of their
own self interest. Rather, the defrauding of the plaintiff “was
typical” of many similar transactions carried out by Ford each
year, because Ford itself “intended, as a matter of policy, to
short-circuit lemon law claims” through the fraud.  Opinion 
at 8; see also id. at 9 (wrongdoing “a matter of policy”); id. at
10-11 (Ford’s “entire customer response program was
structured precisely” to carry out the fraud scheme).  The
intentional wrongdoing was the corporation’s official policy. 
In situations where only isolated wrongdoing by low-level
employees is involved, lower levels of exemplary damages are
appropriate, for example, in a situation such as in the Haslip
case. 
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Third, there was “[c]ompelling evidence” produced at
trial of this official Ford policy, and of its wrongfulness.  Id. at
8. Further, the jury found that Ford had committed official
and intentional misconduct by “clear and convincing”
evidence, and this finding was upheld by the trial judge and
appellate court. This circumstance is important because the
framework set out above, of using exemplary damages to
remove any possibility the offender will profit from
misconduct, may not be appropriate in a case where the bare
minimum of evidence has been presented to support liability.  
If legitimate doubt exists in a court’s mind as to the
basis for liability, the “complete deterrence” framework may
present a risk of overkill and of chilling social conduct that is
potentially beneficial, or that at least is not clearly wrong, and
that concern must be taken into account in a pragmatic
analysis of the best deterrence approach to apply.  But where
no legitimate doubt exists that the defendant engaged in
intentional wrongdoing, as appears to be the case here, the
gain-stripping, “complete deterrence” approach is highly
appropriate, as its purpose is to deter completely defendants
from engaging in clear misconduct which they know is wrong,
as such misconduct has no social value at any level.
Fourth and finally, this case involves profit-motivated
wrongdoing engaged in by a corporation. In a case involving
wrongdoing motivated by individuals driven by spite or other
subjective motives, it can be very difficult to assess what level
of exemplary damages is sufficient to deter similar wrongdoing
in the future, or is appropriate to accomplish retribution in
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the particular instance (by inflicting the appropriate amount
of pain on the individual wrongdoer).  Such an analysis
involves comparing apples and oranges. By contrast, a
corporation is an artificial entity created to seek profits for its
owners. Assuming corporations are in general owned and
managed by rational individuals, setting exemplary damages
for a wrongful course of conduct that is profit motivated at a
level high enough so that the “expected gain” from such a
course of conduct is zero or negative should ensure no
corporation will engage in such conduct in the future — just
as setting punishment below this amount will encourage such
misconduct in the future.
III. The Court of Appeals’ Analysis, Capping the 
Punitive Damages at a 3-to-1 Ratio to the
Compensatory Damages Received by the 
Johnsons, Is Clearly Inadequate to Completely 
Deter Corporate Fraud Policies Like Ford’s
Despite these findings, the Court of Appeals capped the
punitive damages at an arbitrary 3-to-1 ratio to the
compensatory damages that happened to be awarded to the
particular plaintiffs in this case. In so doing, it engaged in no
analysis of whether this level of punitive damages was
adequate for deterrence in light of Ford’s official policy of
defrauding consumers regarding problem vehicles, and did
not even mention the profit factor which was explicitly
approved for consideration by the Legislature in 1979.
Given the circumstances of this case, under economic
principles of deterrence, exemplary damages in this case
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should be set high enough to strip Ford of all profits derived
from its fraudulent policy of using “Owner Appreciation
Certificates” (OACs) to foist problem vehicles on unsuspecting
consumers, rather that ensuring that all problems regarding
vehicles are disclosed to consumers so that a market
transaction with informed consumers can be carried out
regarding each problem vehicle.  Eliminating Ford’s illicit gain
from one fraudulent transaction generated by its wrongful
course of conduct carried out pursuant to official policy is
insufficient to completely deter what the Legislature was
concerned about deterring when it endorsed consideration of
the profit factor:  the defendant’s entire “wrongful course of
conduct.”  Cal. Civil Code § 3295(a)(1).  The fact that Ford
adopted a fraudulent policy is strong evidence that it expected
the policy to be profitable, and that it would be profitable
precisely because in all likelihood, Ford thought, it would go
unpunished in the vast majority of fraudulent transactions.
There are two approaches a court could take to stripping
the gains from Ford’s fraudulent policy.  One, which can be
called the “total profit stripping” approach, is to estimate the
total profit obtained by Ford from the fraudulent policy.  The
other, which can be called the “multiplier”  approach, is to
estimate the likelihood Ford would be held liable in any single
instance of fraud, and to divide the plaintiff’s compensatory
award by that amount — perhaps after making adjustments
for the size of the plaintiff’s award relative to the average case
of fraud, and the time between the commission of the fraud
and the imposition of the punitive damages award.
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It is easy to apply the “total profit elimination” approach
in this case, based on factual assumptions which apparently
are supported by the record (based on amicus’s review of the
analysis in the Court of Appeals opinion and in the parties’
briefs, not based on any independent examination of the
record; obviously, it is ultimately for this Court to decide what
factual conclusions are supportable on this record).  
Ford’s fraudulent policy can apparently be traced at
least as far back as 1996, when the amended California
lemon law went into effect.  Ford evidently issued more than
1,000 OACs every year, for an average savings of $8,000 per
certificate relative to the cost and lessened profit which would
be triggered by full disclosure of all problems with a vehicle as
set out in the lemon law.  This implies a profit of at least $8
million per year in California attributable to the fraud scheme.
Assuming an annual interest rate of 3 percent, the total
profit earned by Ford from its fraudulent scheme between
1996 and the time of the plaintiff’s award in December, 2001
(assuming for simplicity that the scheme began in December,
1996, and each year’s profit was received at the end of each
year beginning in December, 1997), would appear to be
roughly $42.5 million.  This sum reflects the annual stream of
$8 million ($40 million) and the interest income earned on it
(roughly $2.5 million).  If this profit amount had not been
diminished or taxed away through other penalty or damage
assessments against Ford before the Johnsons’ award in this
case, then $42.5 million is the amount necessary to strip Ford
of the total profit earned from its fraudulent scheme.
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The “multiplier” approach to estimating a gain-stripping
penalty is also easy to illustrate in this case, though it
requires additional information.  Under the “multiplier”
approach, the court would first estimate the likelihood that
Ford would be held liable for its fraudulent scheme as the
result of a particular fraudulent transaction.  The court would
then divide the compensatory damage award (or average harm
estimate) by the estimated probability of liability in order to
arrive at a total damage award level that forces Ford to pay for
the instances in which its fraud went undetected or otherwise
unpunished.  See note 6, supra.  As fraud simply involves the
transfer of money from victim to offender, a focus on the
plaintiff’s loss is equivalent to a focus on the defendant’s gain. 
The total award suggested by the “multiplier” approach, in a
case involving fraud, serves as the minimum necessary to
strip the offender of gains obtained through wrongful conduct. 
This approach to setting punitive damages was favorably
discussed in an opinion joined by three justices in BMW of N.
Am. v. Gore (1996) 517 U.S. 559, 592-93 (Breyer, J., joined by
O’Connor and Souter, JJ., concurring).
Thus, if 1,000 OAC certificates are issued each year as
part of Ford’s fraudulent policy, if Ford gains an average of
$8,000 from each fraudulent transaction, and if consumers
sue, uncover the fraud scheme, and obtain punitive damages
in one out of 5,000 instances of fraud, then the “multiplier”
approach suggests an appropriate total award of punitive
damages of at least $40 million.  If the award is corrected to
include interest income earned on fraudulent gains, the
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suggested total award comes to the $42.5 million estimated
under the “total profit elimination” approach.
The intuition behind the “total profit elimination”
approach and the “multiplier” approach is simple.  If a
corporation receives an additional $42.5 million over a period
of five years from a fraudulent policy, then any legal regime
under which the sum of damage awards and penalties
assessed against that corporation over the same period is less
than $42.5 million will be inadequate to deter the corporation
from continuing its fraudulent conduct, and will be
inadequate to deter other corporations from engaging in like
conduct.  The $10 million in punitive damages awarded to the
Johnsons in this case is inadequate under these
assumptions.  However, a $10 million award does at least
raise a credible threat that Ford’s fraudulent policy may turn
out to be unprofitable in the end, and may be enough to give
pause to other corporations considering similar misconduct.
The remitted punitive damages award of $53,435
ordered by the Court of Appeals fails to present even a
credible threat that Ford will be prevented from profiting from
its fraudulent policy.  In order for the award in this case (even
counting the compensatory damage award and even the
attorneys’ fee award) to serve as part of an adequate deterrent
against fraud, other damage awards and penalties against
Ford for its fraudulent policy during the 1996-2001 period,
assuming it received $42.5 million (including interest) as a
result of its fraud, would have to total more than $42 million. 
There is no suggestion of other sanctions against Ford
7 Although Ford mentions actual or possible additional
litigation against it resulting from its fraudulent policy,
including a class action which was settled for an amount Ford
does not disclose, see Ford Br. at 32-36, Ford does not
suggest the sum total of its payouts in other litigation
constitutes even a substantial fraction of the additional $42
million in total profit-stripping penalties which optimal
deterrence theory calls for in a case such as this.
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remotely approaching this level,7 so that one has to regard the
3-to-1 punitive-to-compensatory ratio chosen by the Court of
Appeals as certain to fail on deterrence grounds.  To adopt
this approach would essentially gut any deterrent effect of 
punitive damages, countermanding the Legislature’s directive
that the device of punitive damages is to be used to deter
wrongful courses of conduct, based in part on an evaluation
of the illicit profit received by offenders from their wrongdoing.
To correctly evaluate the deterrent effect of a punitive
damages award, we must consider the incentives of the
wrongdoer on the date on which it decides whether to put a
fraudulent scheme into effect.  In this case, we should
consider Ford’s expected profits on the date on which it
decided to adopt its policy of using OACs to foist problem
vehicles off on unsuspecting consumers without making the
disclosures required by California’s lemon law.  Assuming
Ford was aware that it would use roughly 1,000 OACs for this
purpose each year, and that the average amount saved would
be $8,000, Ford could anticipate a stream of illicit profits of
$8 million each year.  If we consider the period between 1996
and 2001 (the date of the judgment in the present case), the
8 The “present value” method evaluates dollars received
in future years in terms that are comparable to the present
year.  Doing so requires some consideration of the time value
of money.  Thus if the interest rate is 3 percent, viewing the
present value in December 1996 of a dollar received in
December 2001, five years in the future, the present value of
that dollar would be calculated as 1/(1.03)5. 
9 To find this, subtract the 1996 present value of a
$53,435 penalty imposed in five years ($46,093) from the
1996 present value of Ford’s ill-gotten gains, $36.64 million.
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“present value” of that stream, evaluated in 1996, is roughly
$36.64 million using a discount rate of 3 percent.8
Ford would find the fraudulent scheme attractive as
long as the present value of the scheme, after taking into
account anticipated future penalties, is positive.
Consider the respective present value of Ford’s scheme
under the punitive damages judgment of the trial court, and
under the Court of Appeals’ judgment.  Since the $10 million
trial court judgment did not arise until Ford had practiced its
scheme for five years, the present value in 1996 of that
expected sanction, imposed five years later, is about $8.63
million.  Thus, the net present value of the fraud scheme to
Ford in 1996 would still be approximately $28 million (the
present value of the expected profit, $36.64 million, minus the
present value of the expected sanction, $8.63 million).  Under
the Court of Appeals’ judgment, the present value of Ford’s
scheme, net of the $53,000 punitive damages award, is
approximately $36,595,000.9
The “present value” perspective is the correct perspective
to take in a case such as this where the penalty arrives many
-41-
years after the fraudulent scheme is put into effect.  See Yair
Listokin, Crime and (with a Lag) Punishment:  Equitable
Sentencing and the Implications of Discounting, Yale Law
School Working Paper Series (Oct. 10, 2003)
(http://ssrn.com/abstract=434640) at 1-4, 11-16.  The present
value perspective shows that the $10 million punitive
damages award is far from excessive.  Even when taking the
$10 million judgment into account, the present value of
Ford’s scheme remains high.  Indeed, Ford could anticipate
keeping more than three-quarters ($28.01 million) of its total
1996 expected receipts from fraud on a present-value basis
($36.64 million) even if it knew in advance that the $10
million in punitive damages would be imposed in 2001 (at a
present-value cost of $8.63 million), and expected the award
would be upheld on appeal.  In order for punitive damages
awards issued in 2001 to eliminate Ford’s present-value
based expectation of fraudulently gained profit in 1996,
courts would have to issue at least five punitive damage
judgments each in the amount of $10 million in the year
2001; the Johnsons’ $10 million punitive damages verdict
alone would not be remotely sufficient.
The present value perspective also shows that the
$53,435 punitive damages award upheld by the Court of
Appeals is so trivial that it would have no practical effect on
Ford’s calculation at the outset whether to engage in the
wrongdoing.  Taking that award into account, Ford still
retains more than 99.85% of its anticipated ill-gotten gains. 
In order for such awards to provide a complete deterrent to
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Ford’s fraudulent policy, courts in 2001 would have to issue
roughly 775 such awards.  Since 775 punitive damages
awards are quite unlikely to be observed in any court, in any
period of one to five years, the present value perspective
shows that it is virtually impossible for the Court of Appeals’ 
punitive damages judgment to be a part of any meaningful
system of deterrence as envisioned by the Legislature, or
indeed as envisioned by this Court in its own punitive
damages jurisprudence. 
The “total profit elimination” and “multiplier”
approaches to calculating a punitive damages award are
designed to completely deter a wrongful course of conduct by
eliminating the gains that result from it.  The two approaches
suggested here have the additional benefit of preventing
courts from issuing punitive damages awards contaminated
by passion or prejudice, a concern expressed in several
California opinions reviewing punitive damages awards.  E.g.,
Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (1978) 21 Cal.3d 910, 927-928;
Fortman v. Hemco, Inc. (2d Dist. 1989), 211 Cal.App.3d 241,
259; Fagerquist v. Western Sun Aviation, Inc. (4th Dist. 1987)
191 Cal.App.3d 709, 727.  Indeed, without explicitly
describing it, the Court in Vallbona v. Springer (4th Dist.
1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1525, 1539-41 & n.19, approved of the
“total profit elimination” approach when it noted that the
$200,000 in punitive damages awarded to the three plaintiffs
had the effect of eliminating the profit from the defrauding of
120 medical patients, including the three plaintiffs, all of
whom paid between $2000 to $3000 for a bogus procedure.
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Finally to be considered are questions of replicability
and notice that must accompany any system for awarding
punitive damages to completely deter fraudulent conduct. 
Any approach taken by a court in calculating an economically
optimal punitive damages award should be replicable in the
sense that other courts and potential litigants can apply the
same approach to accurately estimate the punitive damages
award necessary to completely deter wrongful conduct.  A
method for estimating punitive damages awards that satisfies
this criterion will also provide notice to potential defendants of
the likely penalties they will face if their fraudulent policies
are uncovered and punished.
A replicable algorithm for calculating punitive damages
awards for long-running fraudulent policies should seek to
strip the defendant of gains obtained from the fraudulent
policy.  Such an algorithm should take into account the
average gain in each instance of fraud, rather than the
particular gain or loss realized in the case before the court. 
The algorithm should also take into account the interest
income earned by the defendant on earlier fraudulent gains. 
In particular, in cases in which the punishment is imposed
many years after the defendant has put its fraudulent scheme
into effect, punitive damages awards should be evaluated on a
“present value” basis.  In addition, the algorithm should take
into account any other penalties or punitive damages awards
that may have diminished the defendant’s profits from fraud. 
See Stevens v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1st Dist. 1996)
49 Cal.App.4th 1645, 1666-68.
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The court will often have a choice between the “total
profit elimination” and “multiplier” approaches.  Both should
produce the same result:  stripping the wrongdoer of gains
from fraud.  However, each approach has strengths relative to
the other.  The “total profit elimination” approach is often
easier to apply and requires less information.  To apply it, the
court needs an estimate of the average gain in a fraudulent
transaction and the number of fraudulent transactions.  In
contrast, the “multiplier” approach requires information on
the rate at which victims sue or regulators punish the firm. 
However, one advantage of the “multiplier” approach is that it
encourages the court to examine the evidence for ways in
which the offender might have escaped liability or
punishment.  Punitive damages should be increased to reflect
any particular method adopted by the defendant in order to
escape liability.  For example, a defendant that destroys
evidence of wrongdoing in order to evade liability should have
the punitive damages imposed on it increased in order to
cancel its efforts to escape detection and punishment.
The more consistently courts apply these policies to
cases of fraud, the less likely it becomes that any particular
wrongdoer can complain reasonably about a lack of notice in
connection with the likely size of any punitive damages award. 
If potential wrongdoers know that they face the prospect of
losing all profits earned from fraudulent conduct, and that
this penalty has been widely accepted and articulated by
courts as appropriate, they will have all the notice they need
and deserve, and they will become quite hesitant to engage in
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fraudulent practices.  Moreover, a clear policy of gain-
stripping for instances of fraud will encourage potential
offenders to focus their complaints about the law on the
statutory provisions and case law which define fraud in the
first place.  As the Court of Appeals aptly noted in this case:
If the manufacturer believes the law is too
vague to implement or requires of it inconsistent
actions, the courts are available to the
manufacturer to challenge the law.  If it simply
does not like the law or thinks it practically
unworkable, the manufacturer has the right to
petition the Legislature.  It should go without
saying, however, that the manufacturer does not
have the right simply to ignore the parts of the law
it finds objectionable.
Opinion at 13.
If indeed the State of California wants those like Ford
who do business within its borders to actually comply with
the existing rules prohibiting fraud unless and until they are
changed, then the courts of the State must avoid helping
businesses ignore these rules by reducing punitive damages
awards below the level required by the “complete deterrence”
approach.
If stated with sufficient clarity and if adequately
understood and acted on by potential wrongdoers, such a
“complete deterrence” regime would in an ideal world produce
the result that no intentional torts are committed, no one is
victimized, no offenders are punished, and no resources need
be expended by society to catch and punish offenders.  Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare (2001) 114
Harv. L. Rev. 961, 1251-57.  For a court to shirk from
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applying, and forcefully articulating, a “complete deterrence”
approach to punitive damages for intentional torts out of an
abstract concern for “fairness” and “proportionality” on the
facts of a particular case would leave all members of society
worse off.  See id. at 1234-59, 1281-1304.  And for this Court
to do so would contravene the Legislature’s endorsement of
the “complete deterrence” approach through its 1979
enactment explicitly authorizing consideration of a
defendant’s illicit profits from a wrongful course of conduct,
as part of a determination of what amount of punitive
damages is necessary to deter such wrongful conduct in the
future.
Conclusion
This Court should reject Ford’s argument that
consideration of a defendant’s illicit profits from a wrongful
course of conduct is not “necessary to achieve appropriate
levels of punishment and deterrence” because, supposedly,
“substantial economic literature” shows that “the socially
correct level of deterrence is created by compelling responsible
parties to pay compensatory damages alone.”  Ford Br. at 36
& n.13.  This Court should uphold the Legislature’s explicit
indication in 1979 that evidence of the defendant’s profits
from a wrongful course of conduct should be considered in
setting punitive damages, a legislative judgment that
comports with more than two centuries of scholarship in the
field of economics, with leading court decisions, and with
Ford’s own position articulated in an appellate brief last year.
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